Tuesday, March 31, 2009

Dasein

So Heidegger, in writing Being and Time, is trying to get at the question of what makes any being, being. This is differentiated from the metaphysical questions that ask nuances (for Heidegger) such as "the highest Being (God) and the Being of all beings" (26). Instead Heidegger is setting up the stage for the question that allows these questions to even be asked, the essence of being or Dasein. Thus his question is far more complex than any question that has been asked before, according to Gadamer. Soon enough, language becomes a great barrier in even asking this question. It makes sense then that Heidegger makes use of new words, he mostly makes up, in order to talk about this technical subject. Furthermore, he even reinterprets words and uses them in completely different meanings (that at times it seems only he really understands). This makes Heidegger very difficult to understand, because the topic is so difficult to ask, the issue of how to begin talking about it, and then the problem of making use of language in a way that this can even happen.

To be honest every time I think I understand what Dasein is, or might be, I feel like I need to completely change my conception. The first time I heard of Dasein was exactly a year ago, and it has interested me ever since (popping up again in the last semester even), but at the same time I feel like my understanding of what it is has changed the more I reread Heidegger. I may just be forgetting about it and realizing how intense of a topic it really is. This may be why Heidegger is still studied profusely now, but I feel like the more I read about Dasein, the more complicated it becomes for me. This might be a problem Gadamer points out, in that, in terms of language, "[Heidegger] is the block that cannot be budged from his place" (37). How exactly is he the block though? And could it be that at the same time this block is keeping us from getting at Dasein, it is also protecting the concept of Dasein from misinterpretation?

Monday, March 30, 2009

Gadamer on Heidegger on Being

It seems that people, especially those who have a certain idea of what philosophy is or should be, are quick to dismiss Heidegger and those who came after him as uttering nonsense, that what they are doing is performing fiction, not philosophy. This certainly appears to be so in the case of Carnap that Critchley pointed out. But Gadamer clearly believes that these people are missing out on a crucial philosophy, philosopher, and way of thinking about the world that should not go ignored. One gets the sense from Gadamer that what Heidegger was doing was a task so momentous and painstakingly necessary, that it is all but impossible to truly grasp his overall purpose without getting sidetracked. Perhaps Heidegger himself was aware of this.

Heidegger is concerned with "Being" - that which exists. Why does anything exist? How does a thing come into Being? How are beings related to each other and to Being, and what are the spiritual implications of these relations? Why, or How, did the Ancient Greeks comprehend this notion, and what has led us to fall astray from their teachings, and how should we read these teachings? At a deeper level, though, we could ask why it is that Heidegger cares so much - what is it that Heidegger and Gadamer see that Carnap and others don't?

Dasein... this notion seems to be almost a religious one. It seems almost like the gnostic version of the soul - a divine being trapped in a material realm. For Heidegger, it seems like Dasein is the beingness of a human, the manifestation of existence and consciousness; the ability to critique, reflect upon and negate that consciousness as well. It is a sort of force, not the self, but a way of being in the world unique to humans. This notion seems to be one of, if not the, major motivator and idea in Heidegger's thought - the human Dasein and it's relation to beings and Being.

"This thinking lacks a language."

It looks like Heidegger’s way, at least from Gadamer’s writing, is that it is new, insofar as he wants to explore the depths of Seiende, and discover the Being in the human Dasein. This “Da” is a signifier for an event, and this da is mortal and fully aware of its own dasein (maybe?) and this very idea or notion of Being of Dasein, is nothing new nor was Heidegger aiming us toward a new characterization of the Being of Dasein, but this concept is and has always been present in us. He is not going to create, at least from Gadamer’s account, a new dimension of Being or “I”, but he is rather going to explore the depths in which have not been explored. Heidegger, it looks like, may achieve this by using new words, creating a new language that cannot be substituted, these words such as the “da” speaks for itself within, it requires no definition because there is no definition besides the one it speaks for. Gadamer even says in this essay that “this thinking lacks a language.”(25)

For the project Heidegger will venture into, it seems like he has no choice but to do what he has done – create a thinkers language, one with no words to define such terms submerged within each of us. No wonder why people have a tough time understanding him, this thinkers language is fighting to awaken the Being within; this can only be accomplished through thought, for language it seems is insufficient and would do more harm than good, to this exploration into the Dasein.

The Faithful Gadamer

I agree with Aaron about the enthusiasm one gets for Heidegger when reading Gadamer on Heidegger. It's all very confusing to me, though. I really can't wait to get into these readings, but I'm kind of anticipating a let down of sorts. Not because I think Heidegger won't be enjoyable or insightful, but because he seems to me (based upon my experiences of people who have had experiences of him) that he can be studied for a very long time before achieving any real understanding of what he's doing and saying. This abbreviated introduction to him might fall very short of getting at that. Well, I'll put on my hopeful hat and ride out the storm, which apparently is violent.

The understanding that I got of Heidegger from Gadamer is that Heidegger is really looking into what is that being behind the veil of thought and experience. What does it mean to be that being and how does one, if at all, get access to some understanding of that 'man behind the curtain.' Hey! Aren't we supposed to ignore him? I get the sense that Heidegger gets frustrated with language because it presents a barrier that won't allow us to converse about being in any realizable way. However, to me, it seems that language is just a convention placed atop the being - it never could be hoped to achieve such a sublime goal as referring to being.

That's my two cents. I hope I'm interpretting this stuff correctly so far.

Heidegger guides us into philosophy by getting us lost

I found the explanation of why Heidegger uses words differently than the accepted definitions or even words that don't have any meaning at all. The description of violently manipulating and re-sculpting language so that he has the words he needs to begin the conversation made me think about the issue of the ineffable. This line of thinking also brought me to the idea that maybe the use of language in this way is more than just to try and speak about something which can not really be spoken about but also to present what can be spoken about in a much more free and fuller light. This allows for new ideas to be talked about while representing old concepts in a way that restores the power back into it and removes the commonness from the idea. I think this, along with his essays as preparations for questions are an important way of understanding Heidegger as a teacher of philosophy rather than just a philosopher. This is because these methods are not used so that he can prepare himself for the question and bring himself to the issues but to put us where he is and force us to see the world renewed and no longer simply common place so that we can see the issues like Heidegger can. In other words he turns us around and spins our world upside down to force us to recollect our bearings.

Heidegger's ways

I kind of knew how Gadamer felt about Heidegger but I wasn’t aware of how highly he thought of Heidegger. Gadamer writing about Heidegger kind of reminded me of Professor Scult talking about Heidegger. That Heidegger is a brilliant man who is sometimes misunderstood. All of the being and being with itself gets misinterpreted and that it takes a certain way of reading him to enjoy and understand his amazingness as a philosopher. If I were to take a couple of things away from reading this, I would say that I am excited to read Heidegger after reading this. If Gadamer can get this excited over reading and knowing Heidegger as a person, it makes me excited to read Heidegger as well. And that it takes a certain understanding and mindset to truly enjoy Heidegger’s brand of philosophy.

Friday, March 27, 2009

For Tuesday

The main reading for Tuesday is Chapter Two, “Martin Heidegger—75 years,” from Heidegger’s Ways by Hans-Georg Gadamer. This short piece should give you some idea of what it might have been like to experience Heidegger’s “new beginning” to philosophy as it came through in his teaching. I’d like you to post on your understanding of, and reaction to what Gadamer found most innovative and significant in Heidegger’s way of teaching philosophy. Other questions you find interesting are, of course, welcome as well.

By the way, some of you might not be familiar with the term “Dasein,” which is usually left un-translated in Heidegger’s writings. Let’s define it preliminarily as “the being of human being,” what I like to call, the “isness” of human being. (You see why it’s left un-translated!) We’ll have more to say about it next week. Meanwhile, remember to post by 10PM on Monday evening and at least for this time, please sign your post with your “actual” name.

Here’s the easiest way I’ve found to access e-reserves:

At the Drake web-site, go to
Library>Cowles>services>e-reserves>course page by instructor>Scult>151, Continental Philosophy>password: continental>Gadamer, Heidegger’s Ways>Chapter Two, 15-27.

Also please “close-read” Heidegger’s beginning to his lecture “Contributions to Philosophy,” and his view of the first beginning of philosophy in ancient Greece, starting with “All being is in Being.” on p. 49.

All in all, a lot of beginnings! A good thing I think. Have a nice weekend.

Thursday, March 26, 2009

The Four Great Errors

Error of confusing cause and effect. Nietzsche states that this is the greatest error one can make in describing how things exist. He gives multiple examples of people deducing that because they are experiencing one thing that it must be the cause of something previous, when in reality it most probably the other way around (i.e. Carnaro promotes his skimpy diet as the cause of his long life, when in reality it was the prerequisites for his long life that actually created such an affinity towards that skimpy diet). This goes as well for morality, in that people usually think that virtue leads to happiness when in actuality a happy life is one that creates virtue. It doesn't make sense to follow something that is supposed to make you happy just to be happy, so instead we should find happiness (through one's own instinct) and then find that which makes it virtuous.

Error of a false causality. This one, I admit, I didn't really understand. It has to deal with the will, "I", and how we assume an internal motive to our actions. This may probably deal more with the fact that we should not deny our instincts and that by trying to explain our actions by "motives" we superimpose a false cause.

Error of imaginary causes. Nietzsche states that when we feel something that we don't quite understand "we want to have a reason for feeling that we're in such and such a state - a bad state or a good state (33)". We aren't happy with the fact that it simply "is" and push further to try and explain it in more detail. He says that psychologically, the unfamiliar brings with it a sense of danger, unrest , and care so that our first instinct is to remove these painful conditions from within us. Therefore, we begin to value that "Some explanation is better than none", even if it really doesn't make any senses (we are dumb and scared and would rather feel safe than accept the strange...). He goes on to state how religion, and primarily the Christian God obviously arose because of this. Consequently, we begin to think more of this assumption of the imaginary cause and it begins to affect us as if it were real.

Error of free will. This is another attack on religion (punishment and ruling) and a little bit on the legal system (as a way of finding people guilty). He states that there is no free will (only instincts (?)) and that it was only created as a notion to make us feel as if we are always responsible.

This all means that human beings simply are and no one makes them the way they are, or "should be"(not God, not our parents or ancestors, not even we know). We are thrown into this world and must figure out who we are, not be told we are to be the effect of some random cause. We pretty much need to stop denying what we are and begin to think for ourselves and be ourselves.

Wednesday, March 25, 2009

Deevolution?

Ryan, you brought up an interesting passage I too marked in my text about how how the weak always prevail over the strong because they have numbers and are crafty. When I read this passage I instantly thought of Darwin and the theory of evolution. When I think of evolution I think of natural selection. As I understand it, Nietzsche is suggesting that "Species do not always evolve toward perfection". This is very interesting for me. On the one hand I have been told that man uses reason and is a social creature because it was evolutionary beneficial for the survival of the species i.e. natural selection. But under the Nietzsche lens, it would appear that evolution is not something beneficial but rather cause for concern. Evolution has turned us into self-hating beasts where our pleasures are turned into sin i.e. Christian morality. I think one of Nietzsche's messages is that we need to recognize this mistake in denying ourselves of pleasure and stop the perpetuation of these values.

"Plato is a coward in the face of reality"

In the section “Skirmishes in a War with the Age” Paragraph (17), he is says “Species do not evolve towards perfection: the weak always prevail over the strong – simply because they are the majority.” Then he goes on to say in paragraph (18), “Everything evil which is the outcome of strength of will – maybe there is nothing evil without the strength of will.” And finally his remarks about napoleon in paragraph (48), “Napoleon was an example of a return to nature.” In Nietzsche’s sense he was progress. How would he tie these together or do they even tie together? The weak prevail over the strong, evil comes from the strength to will, if the weak are pursuing the strength to will because they prevail over the strong, how is Napoleon returning to nature? He even says that progress is “free and terrible” such as evil? Maybe I am misunderstanding him, but it seems to me that if he says that progress is Napoleon and Napoleon was evil and if he prevailed over the strong, would that make him weak – Contrary to progress?

And one of the passages I just had to laugh at was in paragraph (36) when he says, “The Doctors….they should no longer prepare prescriptions, but should every day administer a fresh dose of disgust to their patients. A new responsibility should be created, that of the doctor.” He has a good point here and it has gotten worse since his time, but to many people want others to feel sorry for them and so they go to the doctor to help them feel better and receive some pills to take. Many people depend so heavily upon medicine, when they don’t actually need it, should be told by the doctors to toughen up. and when he goes on to talk about death, I am not sure what exactly he is saying, concerning how one would die in the fashion he thinks one ought to die in.

Now that we have finished reading Nietzsche, I think he makes some very interesting and good points, on how we are prone towards following others. How people do not think for themselves, that we are a herd animal, and the “greats” that have come before us lead us astray. The philosophers who wanted us to think for ourselves in the past merely wanted us to think like they did. And his philosophy he puts forth is in fact – Individualistic. If one truly examined one’s self and believed something to be true for them self, that it does not make it true for anyone else but themselves.

trying to understand

What I have been thinking sense the end of class the other day and also while reading more today is that Nietzsche is very worried about the life we live because most of us do not live our own lives. Instead we live other peoples lives. He seems to be saying to me that everything in the world even ideas have value but this is not because of some natural property of these things but because we have been forced as the beings we are to value them in various ways in order to live. This matches up with the way I have been thinking about the world and Nietzsche's claim that this is an issue only because people are not making their own values seems to be a claim I can support. He seems to think that we can only live our own lives if we value for ourselves, when we let institutions such as the church or people like leaders of countries or the pope or anyone tell us how to value then we aren't living our own lives we are merely living the church's life or the pope's life. THis is a serious issue for Nietzsche and I think that in as far as I agree with him I agree with the seriousness of the issue. I think my real problem with Nietzsche is that I feel he is not interested in explaining himself or defending claims just throwing them out there to be thought about. This is a hard style for me to get engaged with because I dont like the idea of agreeing with someone without an argument/discussion of why I should. Oddly enough, in reading today I came to the conclusion that not only is Nietzsche ok with that he probably is happy that I don't just take his word. But I am not sure if Nietzsche would think it is important for others to take his ideas and flush them out to see where they lead us or not.

Tuesday, March 24, 2009

A Reflection on the Twilight

Nietzsche is a very distracting author. I'm trying to read him as faithfully as possible, and I feel like I can completely understand what he is saying at times, but at others he seems to go on for pages without having a clear point. His style of writing is very artistic, very obscure, but at the same time very persuasive. I think that Nietzsche is truly living by his philosophy - when he writes, he is conducting a revaluation of all of western philosophy, and in order to do that, he has to pour out everything that he is thinking, address his own prejudices, and show the reader his whole train of thought, lest he end up like Kant or Plato, or any of the other philosophers he is critical of, by only giving judgments, without stopping to reflect on the psychological significance of these judgments. I think that this is why he is so critical of Socrates - Socrates didn't "stand" for anything; he used reason as a "last ditch weapon", it was the only tool he had at his disposal to better understand the world and to rebel, in a sense, against the prevailing ideas of Athens at the time, but this was all it was - there was no higher meaning or purpose to Socrates antics.

Monday, March 23, 2009

Twilight

In Nietzsche's critique of Socrates-if it is indeed fully a critique-appears to be his critique of philosophers we read in Fear and Trembling applied to the most widely known western philosopher. In his eighth point (correct term?) Nietzsche compares what Socrates did with fencing, a match where points are tallied and a winner declared-his main discontent with how philosophy has developed into contests with the victor revered.

I also found interest in Nietzsche's 'four propositions'-particularly in the last one because one of my close friends is studying art right now and has devoted every waking thought to it.

I am also curious or slightly confused about what Nietzsche is saying about our senses-most likely seriously confused.

Philosophers

Nietzsche, from what we have read thus far has had a strong critique of philosophers. Yet it seems in certain instances that Nietzsche praises the philosopher. Here are some interesting passages from Maxims and Missiles I found interesting regarding the philosopher.
"in order to live alone, a man must be either an animal or a god. The third alternative is lacking: a man must be both-a philosopher"
"to perish beneath a load that one can neither bear nor throw off? This is the case of the Philosopher"

Another concept that caught my eye was what Nietzsche had to say about reason and the four propositions he gives at the end of "reason" in philosophy. I'm kind of curious as to what others made of this section.

Foreword-Morality as Anti-Nature

Nietzsche does not think to highly of Christianity, he calls himself an anti-Christian not an atheist or anything like that. I feel that his arguments are attacks against Christianity, he talks about how “God sees into the heart it denies the deepest and the highest desires of life and takes God for the enemy of life.” But I feel that whether or not God exists is irrelevant to his argument. It isn’t God he is entirely against it is Christianity and how they view God. I remember him saying as well that only the weak can’t handle their passions and that passions were what human life is built upon.

The Unfaithful Nietzsche II (Twilight of the Idols)

I rather liked this piece of Nietzsche, especially in regards to his commentary on the real and the really-real. Those are the terms that I use; his terms are the 'apparent' and the 'real' worlds. The evolution of these opposed worlds is made clear by the classification of the senses as deceivers bent on confounding us with continual misinterpretation. "Now they all [philosophers] believe, even to the point of despair, in that which is. But since they cannot get hold of it, they look for reasons why it is being withheld from them, 'It must be an illusion, a deception which prevents us from perceiving that which is: where is the deceiver to be found?' - 'We've got it,' they cry in delight, 'it is the senses!... it is they which deceive us about the real world" (45).

If we declare our senses to always be deceiving, to always be hindering us from seeing what is going on around us we ultimately must subscribe to two different worlds. This is the problem that caused Plato to go on about the forms. The pragmatic consequence of this type of world view is that we seek to diminish the value of the apparent and, in so doing, "...we revenge ourselves on life by means of the phantasmagoria of 'another', a 'better' life" (49).

I agree with Ryan on his thoughts, at least pertaining to Socrates. However, worthy of note, is that Nietzsche did see in Heraclitus (a pre-socratic philosopher) some merit. He holds this esteem for Heraclitus because he rejected the common ideas of the day, that being and unity exist in the world.

I hate to cut this short but I just found out I got accepted to grad school and have to call about 200 people.

Twilight of the Idols

It does not sound like Nietzsche thinks the first philosophers were that great. Socrates, for one, may have been an ugly Greek, if he even be considered a Greek. He lacked wisdom and was a clown who succeeded at having men take him seriously. Socrates resorted to his last resort – language. He only did this because he was revengeful and because the whole world needed him. Yet, he managed to create a tyrant out of reason, from Plato onward came the principle Reason=Virtue=Happiness, according to Nietzsche this means imitate Socrates.

In the section titled “Morality as the Enemy of Nature” is he putting forth a solution as to what we should do concerning morality? The way morality is made out to be by the Christians, goes against what human nature is and any passion one has, there is a thou shalt or thou shalt not against it. He then says “The Twilight of the Idols is only a sort of “peace of the soul.”” So is he saying that if we want to be at peace, we should indulge in what our nature wants us to do? Which goes against morals as we know them? Is he suggesting, human nature is what should be considered moral?

Thursday, March 12, 2009

One interesting passages I think is where he says, “This may also serve as a hint to explain the paradox of why it was especially in Europe’s most Christian period and only under the pressure of Christian value judgments that the sexual drive was sublimated into love.” Anyone have any idea about where he is coming from? Yes, people say that they love each other if justifies having sex, if justification is the right word, maybe outside of marriage. But does he think it was the Christians who redirected the notion of sex into love for one another?

Another interesting thing I thought was he talked about how humans are herd animals and we are born to obey, like animals, but are we actually born to obey?

"Supposing truth to be a woman - what?" Then, we must all think like men!

Well...this is what I am getting from Nietzsche. Truth as we know it doesn't exist because we haven't attained anything close to it yet. Thus we must rethink our way of thinking that which we have been already been told to be true. To let go of the clutch, and instead of looking to be right all the time, we need to simply begin to think. The antithesis of things shows that truth is not a singularity but that there is truth in "fiction", there is good in "evil", there is life in "death", etc. Thus instead of thinking in terms of black-and-white we need to think anew and find the color.

Furthermore, we must recognize the antithesis within morality of 'good' and 'evil' (260). The lower class, the slaves or the ruled, has a morality of utility. They are mistrustful, skeptical, and believe themselves to be unhappy and long for freedom. The upper class, the high ranking or the rulers, have a morality of duty towards ones equals. They can act upon the lower class as their heart dictates 'beyond good and evil'. If the lower class were to moralize, Nietzsche states their morality would be based on a pessimistic mistrust and create everyone into the harmless man (good-natured, easily deceived, and, frankly, quite stupid (a regular Ned Flanders)). This he further calls an atavism and makes it clear is something we must avoid.

Nietzsche states that in the beginning nobles were the barbarian caste primarily because of their superior physical being (they were more complete human beings, or 'more complete beasts'). As time progressed, they began to learn about that which they benefited from and thus kept these attributes as virtues. Once these became unnecessary, thanks to the advances of society, they became luxuries. Individuality arises and soon they both (individuality and the virtuousness of the multitude, or universality) cannot live together.

We learn that just being mediocre is enough. He goes on to say that the true goal for society is to create itself so that the select species of being looking to perfect themselves can in fact raise themselves up to that end. He says that this "will to power" is inherent in all life (and with that it is also the "will to life"). We all have an urge to become greater and this can even be seen as the explanation for all human actions, and history as a whole. Even more we wish to acquire rank, to become noble.

If truth is a woman, then shouldn't our method of acquiring her be through thinking like men? (LOL indeed!) But this is what I was thinking about as I read Nietzsche's last chapter concerning What is Noble?. The Noble (what I got from what I understood of Nietzsche) is the manly-man who does what needs to be done, without emotion even, when they feel they can't, isn't afraid of anything (or at least doesn't let it appear so), and accepts that others depend on him. Very interesting Nietzsche is.

Plato ni Nietzsche

Nietzsche brings up Plato several times, especially when he discussed Christianity. It was really interesting that Nietzsche kept mentioning Platonic ideals of morality and faith. I'm confused as to whether or not Nietzsche was comparing "Socratism" to Christianity... it seems like he's obviously making some sort of comparison, but I don't know if he's saying they're really different or if he's saying that there is something very similar between them. I want to know whether or not he's saying that faith has the same implications for Plato and Christianity.

Wednesday, March 11, 2009

the Noble

The Noble for Nietzsche is the person who does not have pity but feels the need to help others through the abundance of power she has. This person also creates a definition of what is right and wrong through her own experience. The noble's morality is one that is discovered subjectively yet is applied universally (if I understood what is going on). With this in mind I am curious about how the Noble is not falling into the same problem that Nietzsche sees philosophers falling into. If the Noble is making a moral theory that she applies universally based on her own experiences then is she really any different than the philosopher who creates philosophical theories in an effort to support what she already thinks/does? This could just be a misunderstanding of the text but I feel like the Noble is stuck in the same problem that Nietzsche seems to dislike so strongly in the beginning of this book.

The Really Unfaithful Nietzsche

Okay... This reading was a bit more difficult for me. I found myself continually agreeing with certain aspects of what Nietzsche was saying (such as that we are inclined to maintain a herd mentality) but rejecting most of his ideas (such as aristocratic state as being the proper way to govern, democracy as institutionalized mediocrity). I think the hardest part to reconcile is that I think we all maintain a little bit of this egoism that he would like to say is what we are really made of. When I recognize that I do have a will to power that resides in me in the way that he states it, I almost feel dirty, but at the same time, I feel enlivened. The conundrum that I think Nietzsche is explaining is that we have traded in our will to power for a world without fear (or at least the goal of a world without fear). While I don't fully agree with him about what we should actually be like, I certainly feel that slave morality as generality is something that we can't reject outright as being false. It reminds me of something I heard on a movie I watched a while back entitled Akeelah and the Bee:

"Our deepest fear is not that we are inadequate. Our deepest fear is that we are powerful beyond measure. It is our light, not our darkness that most frightens us. We ask ourselves, Who am I to be brilliant, gorgeous, talented, fabulous? Actually, who are you not to be? You are a child of God. Your playing small does not serve the world. There is nothing enlightened about shrinking so that other people won't feel insecure around you. We are all meant to shine, as children do. We were born to make manifest the glory of God that is within us. It's not just in some of us; it's in everyone. And as we let our own light shine, we unconsciously give other people permission to do the same. As we are liberated from our own fear, our presence automatically liberates others." - Marianne Williamson -

It is this that I think Nietzsche is speaking to. That we are all powerful beings that have trapped ourselves into a morality that would cause us to fear our own strengths. His resolutions are the things that I can't appreciate. We have to accept that we are communal creatures and, as such, that we must insure the liberty of all of those things we call human. Empathy should extend from each of us to the rest of us, even if we don't agree with the ideas that others have. But we must find a way to reinstate our own strengths back into ourselves and recognize them as things to be cherished in ourselves and in other.

That's my two cents, anyway.

Tuesday, March 10, 2009

Assuming truth is a woman

I'm really interested in Nietzsche's philosophical project, and what he's trying to do with the first part of Beyond Good and Evil. His nihilism comes out very strongly in the first chapter when he talks about the way that philosophers have made judgments and become dogmatic in their practices. The way that he keeps attacking the dogmatists and specifically the Christians shows his dislike of people who assert their opinions over others and try to pass their ideals off as those which are ultimately true. I really liked aphorism 16, because it talks about his not having an I, and what would change about the understanding of the I if it were the cause of something. It was really interesting to see the way in which Nietzsche addresses how the philosophers of 'today' would be too wise to accept as true that which they know they don't necessarily know.

Monday, March 9, 2009

a new species of philosopher?

"To recognize untruth as the condition of life: that, to be sure, means to resist customary value-sentiments in a dangerous fashion; and a philosophy which ventures to do so places itself, by that act alone, beyond good and evil" (Ch 1 Sec 4). Nietzche sees the world in a transitional phase. An arrival of a "new species of philosopher" is arising according to Nietzche. What would these men and women be like? Netzche says in Ch 1 Sec 6 that "I accordingly do not believe a 'drive to knowledge' to be the father of philosophy". After these statements and the attacks he makes on other philosophers in the chapter it seems to me that Nietzche is setting us up for a revelation of sorts about what a philosopher should be, what a philosopher will be. This chapter left me wondering what sorts of transformations the concept of a philosopher will go through by the time Nietzche has made his argument clear.

The Unfaithful Nietzsche

For some reason, yet unseen, I felt like calling my post 'The Faithful Nietzsche' would be an insult to him. Nevertheless, what I've read so far (Tanner's introduction in my text, the Preface, and chapter 1) has been an exhilarating ride. I laughed A LOT! But with that laughter comes a fear that wells up inside. What Nietzsche does is what I remember accusing philosophers of doing when I first began my studies of them a few years ago. He demands that we pay attention to what philosophers are saying from the view that they already know where they want to go! They are just trying to find a way to reason themselves to the conclusion they already maintained! Even worse, I think, is that they then want to apply this term 'truth' to their experience driven-reasonably construed constructions.

Hmmmm.... I've opened up two avenues for discussion and I'm not sure which I value more here.

Fear first, I guess. It is one thing to sit back and enjoy the ride that Beyond Good and Evil takes us on: philosophers, one after another, are set up and knocked down. It's all fine and dandy when Nietzsche is doing that to other's ideas that we don't subscribe to. However, as one proceeds in the reading a kind of tightness wells up in one's gut. This is the feeling that everything is going to go under the microscope. Of course, my beliefs are beyond scrutiny... Or are they? When it's my turn to be looked at am I just as guilty of putting the "cart before the horse?" Uh oh. Please ignore me in my happy little corner over here. But really, that's only an initial fear, I think, for those that truly love what we do, we appreciate our ideas being scrutinized and diminished where they are weak. After all, the process may hurt our egos a little, but don't we come out on the other side either determined to strengthen our arguments or modifying them and, thus, ourselves into something that is at least more defensible? Fear is just the instinctual loathing of the idea of being attacked translated from the realm of the physical to the intellectual. When we reflect on it, even briefly, at least to those who want our ideas to be functional, coherent, and defensible, we should embrace scrutiny. It is ultimately the only way that we can grow. Self-scrutiny fails to be a complete project. I believe we have a natural inclination to endow our ideas with neatly affixed labels that say things like 'Absolutely True,' 'Most Certainly the Case,' 'Of Course!' Unfortunately, this inclination leads us to just file those taken (as in 'we are taken with them' in a romantic sense) ideas as such and never hold them up to the light of day for all to see and ponder. In order for a belief to be justified this 'holding up of' process must take place. Scrutiny is a part of justification.

The other thing - the "cart before the horse" thing - I find a harder time criticizing these days. To me this is just a consequence of being alive. Sure, we would all like to think that we reason to ideas, but that doesn't appear to be the case at all. Our actions are justified only after we perform them and typically only when we are called on to do so. Think about it, it's true, generally speaking. Even when we sit down to specifically reason to a belief it's because a belief that we maintained was called into question and shown to be unjustified. This process occurs because a belief no longer maintains our system of coherence and we must find something to plug the gap. The thing I can appreciate that Nietzsche is saying is that it's all just a perspective. I'm hoping as we progress that he will say that perspective is all we have, though, so, that's ultimately okay. If his message is that we should merely be aware of this (and I suspect as much, given his treatment of the Stoics) and proceed with caution, then I'm quite happy. If something else is going on, I worry for my sanity! ;)

Beyond Good and Evil

Nietzsche is quite a refreshing read. Perhaps a bit discouraging, but refreshing at the same time. He essentially says, "so you think you know what it means to be a philosopher? You have no idea." Philosophy is certainly full of contradictions, and not just the ones that Nietzsche points out. It's interesting how willing (no pun intended) Kierkegaard was to accept contradiction and paradox basically as facts of life, and, in fact, the highest facts of life (the transcendent) and ones that faithful individuals hold. Nietzsche, however, lashes out at this kind of thought. Perhaps it acceptable for Kierkegaard to justify his (admittedly) absurd faith on these grounds, but he should not dare to call it philosophy. Nietzsche's problem is not with Kierkegaard alone, it is with the entire culture of philosophy which seems to think (and has convinced itself) that it's okay to contradict oneself when making statements - these statements about the world serve one purpose - to justify ones beliefs. This mindset is so widespread that Nietzsche asserts that it isn't just a problem philosophy is facing, but science as well.

Sunday, March 8, 2009

"Grit your teeth bravely"

My initial reaction to Beyond Good and Evil is that he makes some pretty interesting points concerning how so many people, especially people from his era, have gotten it wrong or are pursuing a worthless end or asking questions that cannot/should not be asked. I take it he wouldn’t get along with Kant to well, being that he has multiple accusations against him, Nietzsche states “for at that time Germans were still moral and not yet ‘real political’.”(13) This quote comes after he talks about how Kant introduced the idea of faculties. I have not read any Kant, besides what we read the first week of class, I am really interested to see what Kant does write and why Nietzsche is so against it.

Very well written and clear, but he sounds like a madman with all his exclamation points. He criticizes many things, and makes it sound like, alright you are so interested in and want to pursue these questions, you really have no idea what you are in for, but since you have started it there is no turning back and “we are traveling beyond morality” sometimes it almost gave me chills when I was reading him.

Friday, March 6, 2009

Kierkegaard quote

My comment in class about the relationship between philosophical thinking and life as we live it got somewhat confused as I tried to wrap it around the wrong quote. The quote I had in mind but couldn’t find comes towards the end of the Merman excursus (Sorry I don’t have the same text most of you do):

“If along with other things, philosophy were also to think that it just might enter a man’s head to want to act according to its teaching, we would get a strange kind of comedy out of it.”

Philosophy is about thinking, which it takes to be a very serious business indeed. Kierkegaard is attempting to understand, and, in an appropriate way, to teach the paradoxes of faith as they are thought in the Abraham story. So his teaching constitutes a thinking, a thinking that may be joined by those willing to deal with the profound complexities of true faith. A guide to action it’s not. But I’m sure you already knew that.

Thursday, March 5, 2009

Johannes' Silence

Kierkegaard's third problem is clearly presented differently than the other two - he focuses far more on giving readings, or rather rereadings, of several different tragic heroes in order to better understand Abraham. His final conclusion: none of these figures are anywhere close to Abraham. Kierkegaard can understand the Merman, he can understand Faust, he can understand Agamemnon - he can understand every tragic hero in history and literature. But he cannot understand Abraham. This is why, firstly, he presents this chapter in a less direct way (in my opinion); he seems to think that by looking at other figures we can better come to understand Abraham, but his final conclusion is that we can't understand Abraham, in any context. Hence, he is silent. Even Abraham's final words to Issac allude him. The Knight of Faith is alone, Kierkegaard cannot understand him, and neither can we.

Why then, did Kierkegaard write this book? It would seem that the reason is thus: even if we cannot understand Abraham, we can admire him and we can learn from him. Even if we may not be able to become Knights of Faith ourselves, we can at least better understand the nature and form that faith takes. In reflecting upon Abraham's story, we can reflect upon our own lives - how we treat faith in it's relation to philosophy, and think of new ways to tackle the problems that the world faces without going beyond faith, but rather alongside faith (although not perhaps, with faith).

Wednesday, March 4, 2009

Silentio

Now that I have finished reading Fear and Trembling, I realize that faith is far more complicated than that of what I have previously made it out to be.

Johannes de Silentio writes, “Either there is then a paradox, that the single individual as the particular stands in an absolute relation to the absolute, or Abraham is lost.” Abraham contradicted nothing; he questioned nothing and knew that the universal, i.e. the ethical, no longer constrained what he was about to do. He was being tested and it was not a matter of finding a way out, but finding himself, in world where language and reason were indecipherable utterances. Abraham remains silent, not because God commanded him to be silent, but because God has suspended the universal, God has stopped what he has established to govern the world. In essence God lifts Abraham out of the ethical, he makes him superior to language, making language a temptation; if Abraham speaks, he becomes part of the universal, and he saves his son and becomes a tragic hero. But he does not, he does not because it is not an option.

Two heroes emerge as Cameron has said the esthetic hero and the tragic hero; both of whom are hero’s, both of whom refrain from an action or pursue an action to save someone. Abraham is neither, he is neither because what he is doing, applies towards him and him alone. He does not try to save his son because saving his son requires him to break the suspension of the universal; it requires him to question what he is being asked to do, kill his son. In the ethical this is what it would consist of to save his son. Silence is a prerequisite to become the knight of faith; silence allows Abraham to become the single individual and be able to stand in absolute relation to the absolute.

Loving the World

In one translation's Was Abraham Ethically Defensible in Keeping Silent About his Purpose?, Kierkegaard explains concealment in terms of marriage. A girl conceals her love for a man other than her betrothed, the betrothed man conceals his love for another. Because of this neither of them gain the happiness of giving their hand to the one they truly love. As a result, a "remarkable higher unity" is forgone. Kierkegaard goes on to write that aesthetics, a courteous and sentimental science makes everything possible for the lovers. "...In spite of the fact that they did not even get time to sleep over their resolution, aesthetics treats them nevertheless as if they had courageously fought for their resolution during many years...for aesthetics does not trouble itself greatly about time..."(62).
I see Kierkegaard's use of these examples as an illustration of his aesthetic view of the situation of concealment and of the world. He is courageous enough to believe in a "remarkable higher unity", or a higher understanding of faith and God. The aesthetic view turns ethics into an enemy of the experience of the sentimental concept of reality. His example, through his aesthetic (romantic) perspective looks like the tragic ideal of relationship. Instead of thinking of a relationship between a man and woman practically (a man and woman being united for economic and felial reasons), he upholds relationship founded in romantic love as the ultimate goal, regardless of time.
This example helps me understand his view of the Abraham story. He does not look at the biblical narrative in a practical way, but in a courteous, sentimental and romantic light. He sees the story aesthetically rather than ethically, therefore taking every aspect as a reality based in love and the romantic view of the universe. This seems to be an important aspect of faith; that one can see the world through eyes that look beyond ethics and see events, relationships and being in general aesthetically (lovingly).

problem III

In problem III we see the problem of Abraham not telling anyone what we planned to do as a problem that goes against the ethical and oddly enough against the aesthetic as well. Kierkegaard lays out two types of heroes that he believes are the heroes one is capable of understanding. The first is the hero who in believing they are doing the right thing conceals the truth and suffers in silence in order to save the other. This hero is the aesthetic hero; in silence the aesthetic hero is rewarded by the silence through saving the other. The other type is the ethical hero who pretty much does the opposite and tells the truth about everything because they realize that the other has the right to know what they are getting into. Abraham is left out of all of this and once again confuses us by transcending these two types of heroes. He is not the ethical hero because he doesn't tell anyone, yet he is not the aesthetic hero because he does not suffer silently to save another(he is planning to kill the other). Yet, here we are Abraham is a hero and the knight of faith but can not be placed in the two ways of understanding a hero. Abraham is in a very interesting spot in this world he is either a murderer or the knight of faith and he is either a hero because he is the knight of faith or, in not being in a manner which we understand a hero, nothing.

Tuesday, March 3, 2009

God's sake

One of the most interesting things that I read that made me think in Problem II was on page 62. “Faith itself cannot be mediated into the universal, for it is thereby annulled.” Right before Kierkegaard is saying that there is a misrepresentation for God’s sake. “”he hardly did it for God’s sake, meaning thereby that he did it for his own sake. The paradox of faith has lost..”

Monday, March 2, 2009

Absolute

Kierkegaard writes, “The paradox of faith has lost the intermediate factor, i.e. the universal.”(62) The universal is something we are all part of, this why when one, like Abraham, acts out of faith, they are not able to make themselves intelligible to anyone. Due to the fact that they are no longer able to communicate through the “universal” by reason/understanding/ethics, the language that one speaks when in relation to the universal, i.e. others, one is able to understand because there is a standard which presides over everyone; but when one is superior to the universal, thus being in a state by oneself, in a direct relationship to God, one is seen as “mad”. Mad, because the rules which the universal corresponds to are being broken, and cannot be understood except by those in direct relations to God, even then nothing is comprehensible. And cannot be explained, the paradox of faith is like it takes out language or at least as what we know language to be.

Love is not lost when one is superior to the universal; like Nick points out, when one loves thy neighbor one is fulfilling a duty to the ethical, insofar as contributing to this revolving eternal sphere where God is an abstract being with no distinct picture. It is when one loves God above all things, to the point where it may seem like they hate everyone else (family, friends, etc.), where love becomes absolute love because it is love directed directly towards God.

have you met the knight of faith?

the section Problem II not only presents us with a ethical paradox of faith but also sheds some more light on the characteristics of the knight of faith. For example "only when the single individual has exhausted himself in the infinite, only then is the point reached where faith can break forth" (pg 61). I found it interesting that the individual has to be exhausted with the infinite. I think that Kierkegaard is making a distinction between coming to terms with the infinite and being exhausted by it. I think this because he then says only then (being exhausted with the infinite) can faith break forth. Maybe I'm reading into this a different way, thoughts?
Moreover, the knight of faith is in constant isolation having learned that "existing as the single individual is the most terrifying thing of all...(but) will not be afraid of saying that it is the greatest" (pg 66). In trying to understand the knight of faith I cannot help but feel that he/she is at the tipping point of insanity, if not crossed over to it. I know Kierkegaard values Faith as a great thing to have, a miracle, and I too think there is something to that. But, is not it also possible that the knight of faith becomes the knight of faith because he finally lost his mind?

Faithful Kierkegaard problem 1

I heard we didn't cover problem one in our last class and I've been sick (although, it's almost gone, I think! Hurrah!), so I'm posting on problem one here. The first key aspect for Kierkegaard (from here on referred to as "the Big K") is that the particular individual is over and above the universal. By universal, I think the Big K is referring to the ethical. While it may seem that the ethical would be above the individual, the individual does have freedom to act in a particular fashion that suits their own needs and desires. So, the universal as subordinate to the individual is in her power to pursue her own interests. What happens when the individual submits to the universal is a relinquishment of their power to act in ways akin to their own desires and they become part of the universal.

The second important piece to me was the consequence as justification for the action when suspending the ethical. The Big K uses several examples of tragic heroes to elaborate on the difference between Abraham and the tragic heroes. Essentially, the tragic hero does some seeming unethical action, suspending the ethical, and then later this action becomes justified by the consequences, such as saving the state, preserving the culture, etc. The action then becomes admired by all because they could see the sacrifice that the hero made in order to bring about a greater good. Thus, we can shed tears for the hero who makes the smaller sacrifice in order to serve the greater whole.

With Abraham, there is no greater whole to be served, and further, no greater good to come from his sacrifice. Abraham is thusly considered to be a murder by all of those that might hear of the event. However, Abraham's actions are unethical in view of humanity because his intent was to sacrifice his son with no apparent service to society as a consequence. What the Big K does is show that Abraham does suspend the ethical for a higher purpose, only which God can know, and only which Abraham can believe as a test of his faith (if he can even believe that). Ultimately, Abraham has to take the action that God asks of him with only his belief that God has a plan for which he knows nothing of.

The difference between the tragic hero and Abraham is that the hero gets some kind of insight as to what their sacrifice will lead to. They are justified in doing the ethical because they are made aware that the consequence will serve the greater good. Abraham doesn't have this sense and must act only in accordance to God's will that his son be sacrificed. Further, Abraham can't be reassured that any good consequence will come of this sacrifice and therefore can't be the tragic hero somewhere down the road. He has to rely on himself (by believing) and on God (through his belief) to do something for which he is fully aware of the unethical nature of the action. To do this in this light is to suspend the ethical and have only faith.

The Paradox

In Problema 2, Kierkegaard further presents the problem of faith. God has given a commandment: Love thy neighbor. In this sense, when we fulfill this commandment, and preform other ethical acts, we are loving God, insofar as to be ethical is to love God. Thus, the universal is the ethical is God. There is no direct relationship with God - there is only acting in an ethical manner to please God. Thus, when God speaks directly to an individual (like Abraham) and asks him to preform an unethical act, he is asking him to do disservice to God, by preforming God's will. So we are left with the lingering question of the validity of the ethics of the Knight of Faith. Unlike the Tragic Hero, who can find redemption and validity in the universal (he gives up his desire or duty in order to serve a higher duty - the universal, and is thus ethical), the Knight of Faith can find no such validity, except by and to himself. This is faith, if it is not, there has never been faith (according to Kierkegaard).