Thursday, February 26, 2009

Faith

I really like how Kierkegaard is working with us to try to demonstrate the importance of faith and having good faith. It's really cool that he can refer back to the Abraham story and that will help him make his point a little more clear. I thought his chastising was really interesting on page 34 when he talks about faith not being an aesthetic emotion and that it was something much higher. It just reiterates how faith is something that sometimes people will talk about and use to exert their own feeling of superiority over others.

Wednesday, February 25, 2009

Faith 2.0

I really liked how Kierkegaard re-defines faith (at least for me) and how infinite resignation is a prerequisite for faith. It makes the non-questioning church goer look lazy and docile. Kierkegard says, "Infinite resignation is the last stage before faith, so that whoever has not made this movement does not have faith. For only in infinite resignation do I become transparent to myself in my eternal validity, and only then can there be talk of laying hold of existence by virtue of faith" (pg 39). For Kierkegaard, faith is more than saying I believe. One has to first push the limits of skepticism to the breaking point "until there is peace and rest and consolation in the pain" (pg 38). I guess this means that in order for one to truly posses faith one must first be a philosopher of sorts?

"isn't it true here too that those whom God blesses he damns in the same breath?"

Kierkegaard wants to speak about Abraham with the utmost respect. He loves the way in which Abraham himself loved and does not wish to speak about him as if he were a murderer, but instead as a man of immense faith. With this he talks about the amount of impossibility within his actions, how incredibly difficult it really is to follow through with such a task. Although, Kierkegaard is able to understand what is going on and what faith tells him he should do, in the end he says once thrown into the water he would not be able to swim (as many of us wouldn't). Kierkegaard admits that he would never be able to have followed through with the task as was asked of Abraham by God.

Abraham was able to resign himself to God and step outside of his own desires, giving of himself completely to God. "Infinite resignation is the last step before faith (75)". If Abraham had been attached to himself he would not have been able to perform an act that was greatly beyond his comprehension. He had faith that God would provide, all would be well, and that as easily as God gives He can take away, and as He takes He can give again. It is noted, however, that Abraham makes it seem fairly easy (this may be because the Biblical story, as mentioned in class, lacks any mention of emotion or conflict so that it seems like blind obedience) and thus Kierkegaard calls him the knight of faith and, later, the father of faith.

Problema I is interesting in that it gives an account of the ethical dilemma of Abraham's actions. There are 2 types of ethical action according to the text (83). The first is the universal, that which is unchanging. This ethics lies on the telos that is in itself the telos for everything outside. This sort of ethics is the same for everyone and shouldn't depend on the particular. The second greater ethics is that where the telos is preserved in something higher in order that the particular is greater than the universal. However, this state to enter the particular in the universality of ethics is exactly the temptation we all face. This is the paradox that makes up most of Problema I. It seems that the telos of Abraham was itself suspended by a higher telos, that is, God.

I understand the name Johannes de Silentio to mean that if this suspension was made public no one would understand it before it was performed. People would work towards stopping it and completely inhibit further action. By being silent about it until it has been completed then the greatness of such an action will be known in the future, rather than never having occurred at all. Alternately, it may be Johannes de Silentio because Abraham himself was silent because no one would understand him. He had an internal dilemma within himself and what God had asked of him.

Universal

Kierkegaard talks about when faith came into existence, on page 47 he writes, “If this is not faith, then Abraham is lost and faith has never existed in the world precisely because it has always existed.” That at this moment faith came into being; by virtue of the absurd it remains “inaccessible to thought”. Kierkegaard talks about faith as if it is something that is not compatible with human reason/understanding/thought. By Abrahams acting out of faith, he becomes superior to the universal (something we are all part of), thus is justified because he is in a direct one on one relationship to God. When he took this leap of faith, it is like it elevated him out of the realm of human reason, something much higher, something much greater, to think/act out of faith; to become superior to the universal which the ethical controls. By this he is justified by the mere fact that he is superior to that of what applies to all mankind, he breaks all boundaries set by the universal, by following the virtue of the absurd.

suspension of the ethical

As we keep reading we find Abraham is in even more of an impossible, amazing, completely baffling, state. When looking at Abrahams relation to the ethical Kierkegaard chooses to point to a few tragic heroes to show why Abraham is not a tragic hero. A tragic hero does what he/she does because it is believed to be what is the ethical, while sad and hard to do it is still the ethical. Thus for the tragic hero it is a battle between the ethical that brings great sorrow or temptation. With Abraham we have a completely different problem; the ethical is the temptation and this battles with the suspension of the ethical to do what Abraham does. Thus when Abraham kills his son would either be a murderer or have become superior to the universal. He would have overstepped the ethical and become greater in this act that the universal. This is why he is different than the tragic hero, because one can understand and feel for the tragic hero but to say that you feel sorrow for Abraham after he kills his righteous son unethically would make little sense. And yet Abraham must suspend the ethical to do what G-d asked.

Tuesday, February 24, 2009

God tells you vs you think god tells you

I think Ryan brings up a very interesting point about how Abraham's actions would seem today. Well, to put it frankly I think that he would be ostracized if not sent to the insane asylum. Killing your son because God spoke to you, if you saw 'man claims god told him to kill his son' scroll across the ticker on cnn would any of us even faintly believe the man or just pass him off as a 'nutjob'. My point is that in the case of Abraham, the context is crucial for understanding. The story is told in a sacred religious text, held in high esteem, which many believe to be truth or truthfull. So when the question comes is asked "what would you do in Abraham's shoes?" most people would say that Abraham made a correct choice, even though they would deny it in contemporary society i.e. Abraham was told by god to sacrifice his son vs. John Doe thinks that God told him to kill his son. Having said this, I'm wondering what significance context has in terms of how we view faith?

Monday, February 23, 2009

Kierkegaard

The different stories of Abraham were definitely intriguing and excellently told. I am having trouble fully grasping Abraham's level of faith especially in relation to the knight/tax collector he introduces half-way through page twenty seven. I believe that Abraham's faith was not happened upon by sheer luck, but meditated on and labored over - faith does not equal unquestioning belief. I have read the section after Abraham only once and am not sure if I think I understand what Kierkegaard is saying well enough to comment.

Virtue of the Absurd

This tribute to Abraham, Kierkegaard opens up with is amazing. Like it did for Cameron, this text engulfed myself emotionally; it is like I was there witnessing this event taking place. The ‘virtue of the absurd’ is quite astonishing; the way he uses this virtue and connects with it with faith is awesome. That faith takes over when one knows nothing.

Correct me if I am wrong, but in his chapter of preliminary outpouring, he is making a criticism of people who do not want to labor for the fruits one desires. One of the passages he writes concerning theology and philosophy on page 27, “It is said to be difficult to understand Hegel but to understand Abraham is a small matter. To go beyond Hegel is a miracle but to manage Abraham is the easiest thing of all…then probably he (Hegel) himself has not been entirely clear…When I must think about Abraham, I am virtually annihilated.” This is what he wants his readers to realize, that theology sells us Abraham as if it were no big deal; as if what he did, anyone of us in the same situation would do. But this is not the case. This really made me think, because when I have read the bible in the past and reflected upon stories, faith occurred to me, but not in the way Kierkegaard brings light to it. To have faith to the degree Abraham possessed, especially in today’s world would almost seem improbable. Abraham was willing to sacrifice everything that God had promised, in order to be obedient to God. The name ‘virtue of the absurd’ seems very much fitting for the situations in which he talks about.

Excellently, richly , and extraordinarily written, I am very excited for the remainder of Kierkegaard, and look forward to the discussions we will be having.

Faith

Kierkegaard is remarkable in his way of writing on faith and the passion of Abraham. It's really admirable that someone can have so much faith in God and can trust Him to know the best thing for you. I really liked the different readings of the Abraham/Isaac story. The differences were really striking, and it shows different ways of interpreting the story that can give it different meanings and different ways to be significant. The mother is supposed to be representative of God, right? And faith? I get that the different ways that Isaac and Abraham act has to do with faith and the relationship to God, but I just want to make sure that I'm reading that part right.

Johannes de Silentio

From the beginning of the reading you come to understand that the story of Abraham, Isaac, and God means a lot to Kierkegaard. He says that the story had been in his mind ever since he was little. The older he grew however, the less and less he understood to the point that all that he longed for was to have witnessed the event itself. It wasn't that he couldn't imagine the event, but rather that he couldn't comprehend how one would give up all he knows and place complete faith in God. Because of this he sets out to rewrite the story in as different outcomes as he can think of. These never turn out as good as the story that is told in the old testament, however.

The first tells the story of how Abraham tells his son Isaac that he was to sacrifice him at the mountain. This way he makes it appear to Isaac as if he wanted to kill him, and that God would never ask of something like this of him. "Lord in Heaven, I thank Thee; it is after all better that he believe I am a monster than that he lose faith in thee" (46). This is so much worse than the original story, because Abraham loses his son, and God's greatness is never known by Isaac who lives his life as believing God as he has only ever known Him.

The second story stays true to the original until the point where Abraham sees a ram, thus deciding to sacrifice that instead of his son. This is completely anti-climactic, nothing happens, everything stays the same, and no one learns of God's compassion.

The third retelling involves Abraham going to the mountain to plead to God to let his son live. Isaac is not even involved in this version, and nothing happens, except Abraham is eternally confused as to why he would want to harm his son in the first place. He thinks of himself as a horrible father and lets his own misguided understanding of the situation lead him to make a decision against God's plan.

The final version Abraham instead of hurting Isaac, hurts himself hoping this enough to please God. He doesn't realize that his son sees this, and because he does loses all faith in God.

In all these alternate endings the son is lost. Abraham is unable to remove himself from his own understanding in order to place complete faith in God. In fact God is completely absent from these different outcomes. The event had to occur in the way that it did for there to be any significance. Otherwise there is no meaning, no reason for remembrance, no point in having faith.

Amazing writer

This is amazingly written and it pulls you in so well that it is kind of scary. I had moments where I fell into the text and got wrapped up in the emotional connection to Abraham and completely forgot myself. Having said that I would to talk about his tribute to Abraham a little.
It starts with something that I really liked, it was this idea of time and memory as perhaps the most amazing testament to faith. Memory of past generations is our great gift from God which separates us from nature. We have the heroes and the poets, The poets love and admire the heroes for their greatness and the heroes in turn love the poets. "No! No one who was great in the world will be forgotten, but each was great in his own way, and each in proportion to the greatness of what he loved."(13) Abraham was for Kierkegaard perhaps the greatest because while he loved his son he loved god most. Abraham's faith in G-d and love for G-d were not for what was given or what even was seen as possible. Abraham was devoted and unwavering and never thought only of the possible but believed in the impossible too. Even when his wife was barren and they were too old he believed he would have a child. Then when his child was older and he loved his child dearly he did not stop loving G-d on the command to kill his son. In this love of G-d Abraham has been remembered through time, preserved as one of the greatest heroes. Kierkegaard sees this show of faith not as blindly following but as true faith because of Abraham's acceptance of the impossible even though he has not yet been granted anything.

Sunday, February 22, 2009

Fear and Trembling

In his epilogue, Kierkegaard says the world of spirit is in need of renewed passion and self-reflection. "Are we so thoroughly convinced that we have attained the highest point that there is nothing left for us but to piously make ourselves believe that we have not got so far - just for the sake of having something left to occupy our time?" he asks of his present generation (89). He speaks of the self-deception of the people who are occupied by a "trained virtuosity" to perfected self-deception. In Fear and Trembling, Kierkegaard wrestles with the story of Abraham. Taking a story that has been written and rewritten, told and retold a thousand times, and pushing it to its furthest moral implications, he does the work that he says his generation has failed to do. He attempts to make faith real, going beyond the "religion" of his present age. He makes faith real by thinking philosophically about the story of Abraham - a story so often read but so rarely seen moving one to amazement or true faith. Without questioning himself Kierkegaard opens up his heart and passionately lays out his feelings and frustrations in his struggle with the art of believing. He honestly and sincerely takes seriously his questioning as if of the utmost importance, and shows how reflection can be a poetic and lived experience, rather than a cognitive, theoretical pontification.

Saturday, February 21, 2009

Fear and Trembling

There is so much richness in the first forty pages of this book that I cannot possibly address all of the issues Kierkegaard has brought up, but I will do my best.



Like John, I see the critique of Kant and Modernism very clearly: If reason can nihilate everything, then what is left? For Kierkegaard, reason is irrelevant - reason is only possible in the realm of the earthly, the finite. In terms of the spirit, or infinite, reason has no place. So we are left with no reason, and no substitute for reason. Faith is not a substitute for reason because faith is highly personal, subjective, and not rational. It rests on the absurd, rather than the actual, and, because the absurd can only be verified by God, and belief in God is unverifiable itself, faith is no substitute to the promises of reason, even if this reason is not truly reasonable (or actual). Thus, all we are left with are shambles of paradoxes lying at our feet. So Kierkegaard looks for an example, and exemplar, and he finds Abraham, and becomes even more confused then ever. For the faith of Abraham is not mere naivety - it is careful, sincere, and full of doubt and anguish. And this is what makes Abraham a knight of faith - we see what Abraham did, we know who he was, and yet, we haven't the slightest clue as to why or how to get to his point. It is at this point that the crisis becomes greatest and the critique of Hegel blatant - We cannot "know" God, or the Absurd, we cannot quantify faith, and we certainly cannot ascribe values or notations to "World-Historical Individuals" if we do, as Kierkegaard points out, it is not because God has anything to do with it, but because we ascribe a certain value to it - to Kierkegaard it is Hegel who is taking the easy way out, because in a Hegelian system faith is cut out of the picture all we get is: Spirit, and how it manifests itself in the world, regardless of whether or not we choose to believe in it. In this sense, we lose the anguish, despair, and beauty that is faith.

the Faithful Kierkegaard

Okay, I have to admit that Soren was actually not as depressing as I once thought. This could be because I didn't read from this work, possibly. Fear and Trembling (at least what I read of it) was a very poetic and remarkable piece. My comments here will be a little lackluster because they don't really pay justice to the quality of his style.

Kierkegaard uses the story of Abraham to conjure an understanding of faith. Not only does there appear to be a leap of faith, that is typically the essential step for the fan of Kierkegaard, there's a process that must go before it.

Things that are not faith:

Naive, unquestioning belief

Resignation to the impossibility of the efficacy of actions to achieve a desired consequence

The first one is not faith simply because it doesn't recognize the possibility of the impossibility of what one has faith in. The second is actually the last important step on the way to faith. It is an acceptance of the claim that we are powerless to achieve our desires. Kierkegaard says that many people reside here without making the final step to faith and often mislabel it as being faith. This attitude is lacking in the strength of conviction that faith gives. It's a kind of Que Sera, Sera attitude that is what we would call satire - a complete resignation of the human experience to the human consequence with no hopes of rising above it. Ultimately, this type of mislabeled faith depends upon the external world for its maintenance and too easily grows old upon disappointment.

I believe Kierkegaard is speaking directly to the problems that arose in Kant's writing. If rationality (to faith or reason) doesn't work, then faith is the only way to go. To put it clearer, when we have no rationale for believing that reason nor faith can get us any real or realizable understanding - and consequentially consequence - in the world (i.e. we have no efficacy in achieving our passion's goals), the only thing we can do is believe that we will get them anyway.

The leap of faith that Kierkegaard so desperately wants for us (maybe because he admittedly can't achieve it himself) is the acceptance of the belief that even though things are impossible, we will achieve them anyway. He calls this the belief in the absurd. In this leap all things that are impossible (i.e. all things) become possible.

I give it a 9 of 10 - if only I could dance to it... lament.

Wednesday, February 18, 2009

End of Chapter 4

So as I reread the end of chapter four I caught something which puzzles me. “It does, indeed, go against itself, and consume its own existence…as its labor elevates it into a new form.”(76) How?, why? would it consume its own existence? Doesn’t it want to become conscious of itself? Does it consume itself because it doesn’t yet know it’s true self? And again on page (78) he says, “That Spirit does not die a merely natural death.” Natural death according to who, nature because isn’t it separate from nature?

Another thing that crossed my mind and it may be off topic a bit, but what about when he talks about nature being an eternally repeated cycle. So if nature is a never ending cycle, and spirit needs to come to full self-consciousness through humanity; what about the fact that nature goes through ‘ice ages’ where it kills off all its own inhabitants. So, in this sense is Spirits goal of achieving full self-consciousness even achievable? Or am I way off by asking this question?

Hegel Misunderstanding Spirit

Chapter Five was disillusioning at best. Hegel basically states that the indigenous people of the Americas were uncultured and unable to work with Spirit. He doesn't comment on where they were in terms of freedom, simply that the Europeans had to have come and that it was a good thing that they gave them culture. He further asserts that there is no history in the Far East or Northern Europe, and comments that Catholic states are all but destined to fail. Aside from this chapter, I like what Hegel had to say. So, because these judgements are ideologically, rather than philosophically driven (or so it seems to be, being that the little arguments he gives are weak at best), I think we can say that Hegel could have gotten this part wrong, while maintaining that is philosophy is valid. I prefer the "false start" theory we discussed in class to the "Uncultured" theory Hegel presents.

Faithful Hegel pt. 3 (Ch. 5)

Well now... This was an interesting challenge to read faithfully. I did it... but it wasn't easy.

Basically, chapter five in summation. There are two factors that are important for Hegel in determining where Spirit (and consequently, World History) is. The first is temperature and the second is dirt.

First, if it's hot or cold outside, Spirit isn't there. Apparently, Spirit can only thrive where you can wear shorts for only part of the year. If you have to wear shorts all the time (or less than shorts) because it's so hot, Spirit can't do anything because you're drinking so much water all the time that Spirit can't get anything done. Conversely, if you can't ever wear shorts (but must wear greater than shorts) because it's too cold, Spirit can't get anything done because you are always having to warm up the water that you drink. If you find yourself in one of these predicaments, you should move somewhere else - you will never get freedom here.

The next qualifiers for Spirit are in the nature of the dirt on which you live. There's the quantitative dirt quality that comes into play first. If you have too much dirt, Spirit can't get to work. For example, The U.S. at the time had too much dirt. Because people could get away from the people they didn't like (and find some new, uninhabited dirt), there was no Spirit to be had. Spirit needs conflict in order to be effective and sort itself out. Essentially, this means that the U.S. and Australia couldn't contribute to world history because they had too much dirt.

The other dirt qualification is qualitative. Your dirt must also be, well, older than dirt. If you have new dirt, you haven't had time to organize your dirt to serve the people. That has to be done before your dirt can be of service to Spirit. Spirit only likes dirt that has been toiled over long enough for it to be mature dirt. My only question here is how can something be older than itself? ;)

Chapter six was interesting, too (and where I spent most of my time). This is basically what Hegel has been setting up in the previous chapters. It is an account of history progressing from the East to the West. The progression of the Spirit starts in Asia and gets more free over time as the Spirit moves West. The actual working out of this from Hegel's perspective was really interesting. I look forward to spending class time discussing this process.

chapter 5

So I thought chapter 5 was interesting despite my disagreement with his understanding of Native American Indians(which I think could have probably been left out and his point would have still made sense). He is trying to explain how location plays a role in history. History can only really take place on a continuous level, or at least is more likely to, when the climate is such that it will allow for the focus of humans to shift away from nature. If humans are in a climate that is always concerned with the freezing cold or the heat and lack of water then the whole of human intent will remain focused on trying to alleviate these problems rather than moving towards freedom. Thus in these places the creation of a world-historical-person or even a steady progress of what Hegel considers to be history is much harder if not impossible. He tries to explain this by looking at the Americas and showing why North America is the future, though in the end says he is unconcerned with the future. He just wanted to point out the role that land and space plays on development and how the climate and the personality of the people play a role as well. He then argues for the Mediterranean being the center of history because it is what unites the great places of history together.

Monday, February 16, 2009

Another epoch of world history?

"The highest achievement of Spirit, however, is to know itself, to bring itself not only to the sight of itself but also to the thought of itself. But this accomplishment of Spirit is at the same time its decline--to make way for another Spirit to come forward, another world-historical people, another epoch of world history" (pg 75).

This passage in particular resonated with me because of the example of the holocaust we have been using in class and how it is a step in the progress of world history. It was said in class that the holocaust did not have to happen, but was bound to happen. Furthermore, it was my understanding that events such as the holocaust made progress in world history by various means such as having us as humans re-examine how we live to try to make a better present. However, is this the case, have we truly learned from the mistakes of the past? Today genocide is still prevalent and has no signs (as far as I can see) of diminishing or stopping any time in the near future. I think Hegel would say that although Genocide is still prevalent today, that it is not evidence that we show no progress in world history. Hegel speaks about the accomplishment of Spirit as being a good thing that at the same time is its decline. Perhaps the holocaust was not a big enough slap to humanity's dazed face and things must get worse before we make way for another spirit to come forward, another world-historical people, another epoch in world history?

the course of world history

The realization of the self-consciousness of the Spirit brings about an understanding of history as progressive. Hegel states that changes in nature hardly bring about something new, in this sense it is just an endless flux of change. Only changes that occur in the realm of the Spirit can anything new, completely different, ever occur. And it is through humanity that the actual capacity for change, a change for the something better perfectibility is made possible (57). This however brings about a question. The concept of perfection only brings out a notion of "What is better?" or "How is this perfection determinable?". Perfectibility is an indefinite concept, thus meaning that even if it is accomplished, it may never be formally recognized (...maybe?).

With the idea of perfection, Hegel introduces the principle of development. The determination, however, as has been stated before is the Spirit. The Spirit becomes the ends, but it is also becomes the means to that end. Through this exists the duality. The Spirit is determined to be realized, but it must at the same time "overcome itself as its own truly hostile hindrance" (59). The Spirit wants to realize its actuality, yet at the same time it conceals its own actualization from itself. Hegel explains this in relation to World History. the events that occur in history occur within the nations involved, but at the same time they can only be understood in their relation to that nation.

"Here we can only point out that Spirit begins from its own infinite possibility, but only from the possibility.(60)" This makes the concept of Spirit seem almost circular. The Spirit is infinite possibility, and through this possibility is the realization of its infinitude made possible. Thus, the Spirit is both the purpose and the goal. World History becomes the movement from the "imperfect to the more perfect".

He further states that before narrative and written history (pre-history), the world was in a "state of nature". The German term for "history" (Geschichte) derives itself from the verb "to happen" (geschehen). This emphasizes the relationship between the objective and subjective. It is only through proper history that the narration of history is remembered. And only through its own recognition has the actualization of the Spirit, as a possibility, been brought to existence.

History Confronting Itself

Hegel cuts many phases and events in “world history” out by saying “Only in the changes that occur in the realm of Spirit is there anything new [/real]” (57). I understand and identify with Hegel’s idea that the development of history, a process of determination, consists of the Spirit overcoming itself as its own enemy and therefore arriving at a truer concept of itself. I interpret Hegel as saying this can happen on the individual scale and in State as a whole. Each state has its own stage of determination and differentiation in which it “posits determinations in itself, then negates them, and thereby gains in this negation an affirmative, richer, and more concrete determination” (67). Although a simplified example, I think of the American Civil War as an example of this process/progress, in which the “state” itself struggled against itself to more deeply realize its inner consciousness/identity. History is made up of these stages of differentiation, or Volksgeist.
I think I understand Hegel saying that a state is a meaningful part of history when its will is congruous with the will of the Spirit. The spirit of the State can be in alignment with the World Spirit; the subjective events can combine with the objective narration. But it seems that this is where history (in memory or recorded) has the potential to be erroneous and even made up, since it seems very rare that a leader or state’s will and consciousness is aligned with the true narration of the Spirit’s self-consciousness of freedom. When a community or authority has an interest or purpose that is incongruous with the will of the Spirit it would change the mnemosyne; it would have an inaccurate memory of its past, present and future and thereby change the course of events bringing it down a dangerous path.

Chapter 4

At the start of chapter four he goes into talking about historical change and that is always striving towards something better, something more perfect then the present state it is in. in this way it is unlike nature because nature is a never ending repeated cycle. And new things always remain in the realm of the spirit for history. Humanity is part of history, and we are what makes history what it is, the mere substance; humanity has the actual capacity for change and the drive toward perfecting itself.

Perfection only comes to be through development and he talks about perfectibility being part of the principle of development. This is without purpose or an end and there is no standard for judging itself. Is that because humanity is always, in the grand scheme of things, gaining ground on becoming perfect? He talks about how the spirit uses history and nothing happens due to chance, for the spirit determines history solely. But the spirit stands in the way of itself and strives toward knowing itself but it hides itself from itself. How? Why? And this process is not peaceful as compared to that of organic life.

This history Hegel is talking about comes into existence when rationality appears in consciousness, will, and action. Because from tribal traditions or family memories even though these may have survived, they created nothing substantial, compared to state, laws, and records. How is he talking about language and its relation to history? He says it is the activity of theoretical intelligence in true sense, what does this mean? And wouldn’t the existence of language be enough to take into consideration of what happened before there was a “state”?

Saturday, February 14, 2009

Marx reading Hegel

I think that the questions about "where is history going?" Thursday were very much in the vein of Marx insofar as I think that Marx was making predictions about how Spirit was going to become fully self-conscious and then Lenin thought it might make sense to help Spirit along. It isn't clear to me that Hegel would have taken this view particularly since Hegel views the passions of individual people as distinct motives from whatever is moving the Spirit to self-consciousness.

I keep thinking of general social science and that we can predict with amazing accuracy how traffic will move without knowing anything about the particular drivers. The general movement of "traffic" (analogous here to Spirit) is governed by different rules that the movement of the individual cars each of which is governed by the motive of the driver of that car.

Thursday, February 12, 2009

My own spirit

I can't help but wonder if I am the one causing the problems that are going to need fixing in the future or am I the one fixing the problems of the past right now?

After the much needed re-re-read

OK, this is my understanding of what Hegel is saying, please correct me where I have strayed.

Passions of the individual are a good thing, that is when those passions are acted on that events take place. Those events that have been acted on become the World History. That the World History inevitably nears the culmination of freedom as determined by the Spirit.

-I would argue that the Spirit is indeed in every individual just as it is in the will of the state, because individual passions can create, alter, or destroy the state. This however would mean that if I had built the chair and the essence of the chair would become a part of me simply because I have built it. However, if every individual is a part of the state and embody the state, and the state and the Spirit are conspirators then, as a representative of the state, the individual would also be a representative of the Spirit. (Yes, no, maybe?)-

It appears that whether 'good' (jazz) or 'bad' (Holocaust) passions are in existence and acted on the world history will always move in a manner that will fulfill the goals of the Spirit. Passions that result in 'bad' events are acceptable, or even encouraged because it forces passions that result in 'good' to arise and expunge those passions that result in 'bad' events. The most catastrophic event that we thought of was the Holocaust which we all agree happened (except for some far out members of the world including a Catholic bishop) and was horrendous, however it served to enlighten the people of the world about the gross stupidity and fallacy of thought and social structures grounded in basis of ethnic superiority.

Having managed to explain all events in the world as being governed by Reason and striving towards the goal of history which is, the Spirits consciousness of its freedom as well as the actualization of that very freedom. I understand this to mean that the individual hungers and thirsts for freedom whether conscious or not and will strive to gain that freedom for themselves and will work to spread that freedom in the world like cream cheese on a bagel.

Hegel says,"every human is free by virtue of being human, and that the freedom of spirit comprises our most human nature". I want to know what freedom means to Hegel, and if he sheds light on this anywhere in the text please enlighten me or if anyone has separate thoughts on freedom. An attempt: freedom is the availability for the individual to act as they wish to act, think as they wish to think, believe as they wish to believe, all in accordance with Reason because after all, Reason is the law of the universe. Reason guides actions more often then not and as a result would guide the history, present, and future.

Wednesday, February 11, 2009

chapter three reread

After our last class my understanding of this chapter changed a lot. I am not sure if I am really where I want to be with this yet but such is life. Passion seems to be key in the cultivating of the spirit willing freedom. It is through the passions of the passionate that we progress and move forward towards complete realization of freedom. Though it is with reason that the spirit moves us. We don't randomly hop from one event to the next and stumble into progress. WE move forward through the passions of heroes who make the next step that is only presented to them because all the necessary pieces are there to make it happen. These moves forward only happen because the times had come to a point where it was with the possibility of happening in this way. To go back to the example of jazz(much less depressing than the holocaust) which could not have happened in ancient Greece. It could not have happened in that particular time and place because the ingredients were not there to reasonably bring it into being. So when we look at one event we must look at it it's happening as making sense and as being also an ingredient in the happenings that follow. All of this in the cultivating of freedom.

Faithful Hegel pt. 2

Same thing as I said before. See below...

Reflection of Tuesday

After yesterdays class I think I understand what we have discussed a lot better. The biggest confusion I was or am still having is about Freedom. Freedom is the final goal and we being agents of world, the spirit is free in us and thus “directing” us toward unconsciously the final goal. But at the same time the spirit is not free because it is unconscious of itself? And when hideous events take place they are indeed good in the sense that it needed to happen to fix the crisis in the world. That if they did not take place the problem would have turned out worse than it was or would fail to lead itself toward the final goal of the world.

Tuesday, February 10, 2009

I am extremely confused about Hegel's Spirit, I understand that freedom and the Spirit are somehow related. Not exactly sure but in my understanding freedom is the essence of Spirit, and the very existence of the Spirit creates freedom (this could be completely incorrect). What is Spirit though? That's partially what I am confused about, I know Spirit and freedom are either the same thing or very closely linked together, but what is Spirit? If all of history has been aimed at freedom, not of the physical but of the mind, what is necessary for this type of freedom? Does this mean that someday we will have reached some zen-like state of being and all with be right with the world?

Monday, February 9, 2009

Freedom

As Hegel opens chapter three by saying that “the question of the definition of Reason in itself coincides with the question about the final goal of the world.” And to be able to understand the final goal we must be able to understand the world. By understanding the world we break it into two parts physical and mental. The mental being the Spirit is the substance of history. So he saying that if one examines the spirit of the world, one will come to the definition of reason or similar? Then he goes on to talk about the nature of spirit and examines how orients believe one to be free, while Romans knew some were free, but Germanic peoples through Christianity realized that all were free by virtue of being human. How is he relating the freedom of the spirit to the freedom of humans? Because though he says that “the Spirit – the human as such – is free.” And since all humans are now realized to be free, the spirit now being free? Isn’t that the goal of the spirit? I realize I am missing something but what is it?
What interested me mst about this section was the concept that nothing can be looked at as an independent happening or thought. He talks about governance and how states come to be governed as they are. He argues that a government is never the product of theoretical discussion but is a necessary component to the people. A government comes about because of the people, the culture, religion, and philosophy. When looking at history we can see the "reason" in it and understand history through the understanding that all things are that way in history because they have to be because of the spirit of the state because the state is an individual totality. It is with this theory of history that philosophy is able to understand history as opposed to religion which argues that history can only be viewed as a product of providence which they claim to be hidden in the unknowable God. Philosophy uses reason instead which allows for the possibility of understanding the events in history by understanding the unity of religion, art, and philosophy in the spirit of the state.

The Faithful Hegel

As I've decided that my project for this class is to learn to read faithfully (as opposed to suspiciously), this post may end up well off the mark in regards to our dutiful question: what is continental philosophy (for?)? If this displeases - let me know and I'll come back in line. :)

At first I simply had to make a decision to read the text faithfully, to read it as though there were no ulterior motives developed by the author to ensnare me in a particular view (intentional or otherwise). This was actually a lot easier than I supposed it would be. I feared that I might fall into my old habit of picking out concepts (e.g. teleological predisposition, God as reason, etc.) that I found to be particularly damning and just label the text as useless because it contains these undesirable attributes. However, that didn't really happen. Once I decided to read faithfully, I simply accepted the work as is and tried to attach as little of myself as I could to the process. In doing so I shifted a lot of authority over to Hegel to tell me the state of the universe. In doing that, I feel like I got a better understanding of him.

Specifically, it appeared to me that union is of the utmost importance to Hegel. Especially in regards to freedom and necessity. I decided with the little evidence that I have that this is related to the "vicious dualisms" arrived at by Kant. For Hegel there is this problem of how freedom and necessity can exist concurrently in the world. To resolve this problem he defines freedom as the subjective and intentional individual actions that humans use in order to attain their desires. For necessity, there is the Spirit or universal reason. The unfolding of Spirit is the manifestation of that Reason within the organic world. In very very brief summary, the unfolding of the Spirit is manifest through the state. The state changes from time to time through the freedom of the individuals that are seeking their own ends. These people that change the state have no idea that they are doing anything other than appeasing their own desires. However, hidden from themselves, Spirit is manifesting (or maybe unfolding in this case) to bring about another step in the progression towards the end, which is freedom. The individual and the desires of individuals are the means by which Spirit gets what it needs to unfold.

This Spirit is manifest in the state as I already said. But what does this mean? Hegel says that the Spirit of the state is composed of its culture: art, religion, philosophy and determines rightly how the state behaves in regards to its citizens. As the goal of Spirit is to become conscious of freedom, so too, freedom is the goal of the state. I don't remember seeing a passage stating as much, but I don't think Hegel would disagree that the state doesn't fully realize this goal. It merely goes about acting out its intentions in order to obtain a state that it desires. Freedom is the hidden goal that the state doesn't necessarily perceive.

The union of necessity and freedom then is a state that has maximized the freedom of its citizens and minimized the necessity of their actions. This means that citizens are free to act out their desires in all possible ways as long as those desires do not conflict with the goals of the state (although on occassion necessarily in conflict because Spirit must continue to unfold). I hope that's an accurate description of the work (within the scope of what I'm saying here), anyway.

Worthy of note here is that I found several passages that I could see other philosophers reading and taking them as their own ideas (not plagarism, but something they could build upon). Nietzsche and Heidegger, specifically, but I'm sure there's more that I missed. It was very interesting to see the influence that Hegel has on the dialectic.

Sunday, February 8, 2009

Contradiction causing progress

The supplemental text by John Sibree put into words an intriguing aspect of Hegel's philosophy. The project of his philosophy was to an extent an attempt to unify contradictory aspects of existence. I like the words “comprehensive”, “evolving” and “rational” in describing the unity Hegel tries to work out. Sibree says "the main character of [Hegel’s] unity was that it evolved through and manifested itself in contradiction and negation” (Sibree 1). Hegel has these points of contradiction such as knowledge and faith meet each other and bring out qualities in the other “uplifting” them toward a more unified whole. This can be seen when he addresses the tension between private interests of individuals and the universal goal of the state. An essential element of the historical perspective is the struggle between the state and the passions of its citizens. But the unified Idea that is inherent in both is what allows the “long, hard discipline” that drives history forward makes progress possible.
Humans are not always cognizant of the goal of world history (“the fulfillment of the concept of the Spirit”), but the struggle that occurs between the human being and the whole of which she is a part brings forth the realization of that goal over time. Hegel says this goal is unconscious to begin with but is built into the nature of the world and of people. What he means by this “nature” I am not sure, but I would guess that it is something whose potential is met when set up to struggle through the tensions with its counterpart “mind”. For example, the coherent nature of the whole of world history is brought about by the mind; “it is mental because it is mind that can comprehend all of these phases and sub-parts as steps in its own process of comprehension. It is rational because the same underlying, logical, developmental order underlies every domain of reality and is ultimately the order of self-conscious rational thought” (Sibree 1). From what Hegel writes, it sounds like this happens in several different phases (of world history and individual life) over time.

Providence and Reason Revisited

In view of our discussion last time concerning the relation between Providence and Reason, I thought it might be helpful to call attention to something Hegel says in Chapter Three: “. . .for Reason is the perception of God’s work” (p.39). It seems to me that Hegel is suggesting in these two chapters that Providence and Reason both refer to God’s plan, only when it’s called “Providence,” it remains internal to God and unknowable to humankind, as in “It’s God’s will and therefore must be for the best. It is not given to us to understand His reasons, and so we must simply have faith.” This is the laziness of religion that Hegel referred to in Chapter Two. But philosophy recognizes God’s plan as “Reason” and so within the capability of human being to understand. As I’m fond of saying in my classes, “You’re not going to find something you don’t think is there.” So it is essential for Hegel in this, the Introduction to the Philosophy of History, to make this distinction between religion and philosophy clear to his students, thereby making a course in the Philosophy of History possible.

Notes on "Freedom, Individual, and State"

Hegel's reasoning, although it is a bit hard to follow at times, appears to be sound. He begins the third chapter by stating that there are two considerations of the "final goal" of the world. First, the content, and secondly, it's actualization. This is very similar to his assertion that we should look at both the intention, and the activity, when it comes to human actions. Hegel equates Spirit with freedom. This is ambiguous to me. Is having freedom, preforming acts of free will, or merely being able to think freely, Spirit? Freedom as a term encompasses a number of beliefs, theories, and actions. However, this is a minor point. The importance lies in Spirit's ability to be self-conscious: for freedom to know itself and to produce freedom. How this is related to Providence is yet to be revealed. As actors who hold passions in align with furthering Spirit's self-consciousness (those with "inner Spirit) step onto the world's stage, Spirit is manifested in the actions of these actors and the world progresses. Hegel notes that there have been 3 eras - the oriental (where only the ruler is free), the Greek (where some are free), and the Germanic (all are free). Thus, all humans are ends to themselves only insofar as they are "used" (poor word choice) by Reason.

Question: If there are actors with passions aligned with Spirit's, and further Spirit, can't there also be actors whose passions are the antithesis of Spirit, and thus detract from universal freedom? In other words, are all actions, in the long run, progressive, or can we "go back in time" in regards to Spirit being self-conscious and manifested in the form of freedom, in the world? Does the Final Goal have a set date, or can we go back and forth between eras?

Hegel's perception of the state is growing on me, although I find it a bit problematic. First, people are morally dissatisfied when the state does not fulfill what they feel is right or good (per Hegel). And this causes, in the course of world history rebellions. But Hegel goes on to say that these are merely "ideals raised by fantasy". So people rebel in order that they may create a new state-structure or government, and this (I presume) is in accord with the Spirit, but it's based on hopeless idealism...

I enjoyed Hegel's depiction of finding consciousness of the Spirit in both Religion and Art (I was strongly reminded of Heidegger; simply replace Spirit with Being). It seems logical that consciousness of Spirit would be found in Religion and art - interestingly Hegel doesn't say that Christianity is the only way to come to know Spirit (yet), merely that Christianity is what lead Europe to further the self-consciousness. This is important because to say that Christianity is a path among a few to knowing Reason and Spirit paints quite a different picture of God, Spirit and Reason than if one were to say that it is the only way.

Finally, I'm not sold on Hegel's notion of a "National Spirit" - sure, at times of panic or crisis (9/11, for example), there does seem to be a sense of coming together, but in peace times, it seems rare for there to be no internal descent among the population of any country. Many nations, as well, don't have a "national culture", but rather different cultures flourish in different parts of the country - "New England Culture" is very different from "Southern Culture", etc. Perhaps I'm misunderstanding what he means.

Friday, February 6, 2009

this may help with Hegel

http://librivox.org/introduction-to-the-philosophy-of-history-by-georg-wilhelm-freidreich-hegel/

I'm not sure how much is actually in our copy, but this is what I could find.

Thursday, February 5, 2009

"reasoning" (hah) through Hegel

Hegel begins his Introduction to the Philosophy of History by noting there are different ways of doing history. The first, Original History, being the simplest, is focused on writing about the time period being talked about within that time. This is the primary source of history since it is where we get accounts and reports of events, speeches, and ideas that occurred through time. The second form, Reflective History, delves a bit deeper, trying to uncover what the past means to our current state of affairs. This is highly influenced in how we perceive (and how we ought to perceive) history to have happened, and their roles as they continue to influence the present. The final method, or Philosophic History, occurs through a thoughtful consideration of history. This is what Hegel wishes to write about, tackling the issue of what we have been given as historical fact and asking questions such as "What is the proper approach for philosophizing about history?".

This leads us to the next chapter where Hegel states that history must, or at least can, be philosophized as a "thought of Reason". Hegel points out that reason pretty much rules the world citing that all philosophy is based upon reason being both the substance and the infinite power of all reality. If one thinks through reason then one must therefore conclude with a reasonable thought (it is impossible to come to an irrational conclusion if one is thinking reasonably, since it would become an apparent contradiction to be reasonably irrational).

Following this train of thought, reason must then state that history must have a nature that is, at its heart, unchanging, or a "World Spirit". He gives us 2 reasons for this to be true. A. Reason rules the world, ex. the universe is governed by laws, and B. The world isn't ruled by chance, but rather by providence (though I don't completely understand what providence is...). And then..........he completely lost me when he started mentioning God (particularly pages 16-18). I feel like Hegel is trying to explain history as a logical sequence of events history is not just one thing happening after the other. The argument so far, is compelling, I must admit, but how can he know that the universe really is rational? I am open to the possibility, but couldn't the universe be completely irrational as well? Maybe this is why he tries to ground it in God, by trying to state that God is good and would never make an irrational universe.

Wednesday, February 4, 2009

Hegel's Spirit

Hegel’s idea is that the Spirit should be the most fundamental, essential focus of the philosophy of history. First though, he presents “Reason” as the natural nous of world history; the substance the drives and guides histories events. He separates its manifestations into two groups: the natural and the spiritual. Later he connects the natural and the spiritual saying “…even if you (the student) do not bring to world history the thought and the knowledge of Reason, you ought at least to have the firm and unconquerable belief that there is Reason in history, together with the belief that the world of intelligence and self-conscious will is not subject to chance, but rather that it must demonstrate itself in the light of the self-conscious Idea” (13). He is making large presuppositions (as he himself admits) about the “religious form” of the universe, and says that philosophy must be open to these presuppositions, allowing itself to believe in Reason as it first approaches historical philosophy. I would add to his position that one distinguishing aspect of “continental” philosophy is its willingness to presuppose, and this is something that I’m sure happens in analytic philosophy as well.
As he continues to flesh out his imagining of the “Spirit” he binds together the two distinct parts, the ones that Anaxagoras failed to piece together; that of applying the abstract to the concrete, i.e. world history, and finally reveals that what he means by Reason is the same thing is what he calls “divine providence”. This he calls a “theodicy”, a “justification of the ways of God” (18). So, as I interpret Hegel, the philosophy of history is a justification of Divine Reason in the history of the world. Of primary importance to the philosopher, whose way of approaching philosophical history is to finish Anaxagoras’ unfinished work, is to grasp Reason in its definition. What does Hegel’s perspective on the Spirit/Reason imply about “continental philosophy”?

Reason, Crisis, and Hegel

What Hegel seems to be addressing in this book first and foremost is the relationship that a people or culture should have with it's history. This is best exemplified, I believe, at the end of Chapter One where, after giving a brief description of methods of doing history, posits the question of whether or not philosophy, being speculative and subject to predispositions, has any right or reason to get involved with these methods, and history in general, as history is concrete and affirmed. He writes "This contradiction, together with the reproach springing from it in regard to speculation, must here be clarified and resolved." So we know that the book will focus, at least in part, on this clarification of philosophy's interest in history. At the same time, however, Hegel is also getting at something deeper - the role in which Reason plays in the unfolding of historical events, and how these events and their originators (e.g. Napoleon) are manifestations of the "World-Spirit". I do not fully understand how or what Hegel means by this - I am reminded at this point of Tolstoy's War and Peace. So, if Continental Philosophy is concerned with uncovering or creating crisis, what is Hegel's crisis? At present, I don't feel like I can assert an opinion, and look forward to what others feel in this regard.

Reason rules the world

“Reason rules the world” and he says that history has been rational in its course. How can this be? What exactly does Hegel mean when he says this, because yes the idea of reason may have always been present but have the rulers of the world been rational in their decision making? Or doesn’t that matter? And then states two ways in which this is possible through 1) laws of the solar system and 2) ruled by providence. And as he points out that knowing divine providence is saying one knows God. If we can know God how does he recommend we achieve this? Through reason, because even he points out that reason is just as indefinite as providence and we cannot even place a definition upon this. I can see what he saying in regards to how reason rules the world but then he says that this is indefinite. What does he mean?

Tuesday, February 3, 2009

Reading Philosophy as Possibility

The problem of how to read philosophy or, for that matter, anything serious that might affect how you see the world, is taken up by Gadamer whom we’ll study later on in the semester. But I thought a word or two on the problem as it arose today in class, especially as articulated by John and Merle, might be helpful at this point.

A continental philosopher we won’t have a chance to talk about this semester named Paul Ricouer tried to deal with the way in which suspicion can sometimes interrupt one’s understanding of a text, by suggesting that genuine understanding, that is, a true commitment to understanding the words of another, be divided into two moments. The first one he called “the hermeneutics of affirmation,” and the second, the “hermeneutics of suspicion.” In other words, we first “listen” to the words of the text as if they are true. We affirm them in the fullness of their possibility. This is the way I try to teach the texts that I teach. What sometimes happens (I choose texts that I think offer this possibility) is that one hears the truth originally spoken into the words. This moment of affirmation is risky obviously, but one only takes this risk if one assumes (as one can in the case of the great philosophers) that a genuine encounter with the text might yield an aspect of the truth.

Furthermore, it’s not that one completely dumps one’s critical faculties before entering into an encounter with the text, as if that were even possible. Rather, knowing how one’s own biases— one’s critical faculties— usually work, one softens them, quiets them a bit (Perhaps you know your prejudices well enough that you can lovingly say to them, “Shut up for a moment and listen.”) so one can hear the words of the text in their “possible rightness and truth”(Gadamer).


One is then ready for the second moment, the critical moment. Here’s where the question of danger raised by Merle comes in: How might the text you’ve come to understand (more or less) be wrong, or perhaps just part right, or perhaps right but dangerous? And what are you going to do about it?

There are obviously serious problems with this approach that we’ll get into when we study hermeneutics with Gadamer, but I wanted to bring in Ricouer and hint at Gadamer in order to point to an experience in reading which the hermeneutics of affirmation makes possible. The experience I mean is nicely articulated by James Boyd White in an essay he entitles “A Way of reading”:

“. . .I wish to exemplify what I call a way of reading: a way of engaging the mind with a text, and learning from it, that will affect the way one lives both with other texts, including those of one’s own composition, and with other people.”

forgetfulness of being

Pg. 119 Maybe someone can answer my question. What does Heidegger have against mobile homes? Technological world attributes to the forgetfulness of being phenomenon like the Internet and cell phones...agreeable, but why did mobile homes get thrown into that? Couldn't any mass produced home get added, or maybe any home for that matter?

Monday, February 2, 2009

Unreachable?

Philosophy at its best seems to be a non-existent possibility. It would entail to link the gap between the central idea throughout Critchley, knowledge and wisdom, truth and meaning, theory and practice, causal explanation and existential understanding. It seems as though if one question was asked another would come up to question the reasoning behind the rational. Part of the problem seems to be a never ending criticism of the new ideas that evolve throughout time, to constantly work towards something greater and better and to strive to know why things are the way they are. But is this a problem or a mere step forward in the world we live in? Science seems to answer and put this “problem” to rest, of not knowing; but is that true? As Carnap would argue if it is “meaningless” in the grand scheme of things then it is worthless. I found it interesting that when he wrote his essay in 1933 he used Heidegger as his topic and he didn’t try to prove him wrong but worse he proved that he was worthless, wasting his time. Human beings have and will always possess an ego “self” and having different ideas of how the world should be looked upon. The labels placed upon philosophers are damaging according to Critchley and do no good when working towards fulfilling what philosophy could become.

Philosophy at its best

It seems to me that the book lays out a task for philosophy as a whole and says that this is what philosophy ought to be doing. Through out the second half of the book we see the gap between continental philosophy and analytic philosophy grow. This gap is characterized by the gap between knowledge and wisdom, of which each side has claimed one. The continental track has taken on wisdom as their study, arguing that science is not the best or main way in which we can understand the world. Instead we must look to experience and the forming of a metaphysics which hearkens back to Aristotle. On the counter Analytic philosophy was pursuing science as the only way to gain knowledge and in the verbal battle between Heidegger and Carnap both argued the other was completely off base. Now philosophy must begin to look at the gap which has been created and work to minimize it. The how is what philosophy at its best is. Critchley states on page 125, and I have been convinced, that philosophers need to begin to think for themselves and work forward without the restrictions that a title has put upon them. Philosophers must put forth new theories that are well thought out and argued. Philosophy must stop being an indevour just for the philosopher to sharpen her common sense but instead be clear theories that push philosophy and perhaps other fields out of stagnation and keep alive the possibility of new emancipation.

A Note on Heidegger's Use of Language

Sometimes things work out such that moments in the text or discussion early in the course point to issues to be picked up later on. Such is the case with the highly problematic nature of Heidegger’s language, and I thought it might be helpful if I made note of it.

Critchley nicely captures the difference between Carnap and Heidegger in this regard on page 103:

"Heidegger encourages us to undergo ‘an experience with language’ that cannot be captured in any formal metalanguage (nor can it be verified in any logical or empirical way[A.S.]). Carnapian ((ouch!) logical metalanguage would be as far from that experience as one could imagine."

Said “undergoing an experience with language,” with its accompanying pleasures and difficulties is precisely the theme of the essays in our main Heidegger text, On the Way to Language. Isn’t that nice?

A.S.

Sunday, February 1, 2009

So, having finished the Critchley book, what are your thought on what philosophy, at its best, should be and how do you think we can best approximate this goal as we move forward together to discuss Hegel, Kierkegaard and then Nietzsche?